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How Sales Taxes Affect Customer and Firm Behavior: 
The Role of Search on the Internet 
 
When a multi-channel retailer opens its first retail store in a state, the firm is obligated to 
collect sales taxes on all Internet and catalog orders shipped to that state.  In this paper, 
we assess how opening a store affects Internet and catalog demand.  We analyze purchase 
behavior among customers who live far from the retail store but who are obligated to pay 
sales taxes on catalog and Internet purchases.  A comparable group of customers in a 
neighboring state serves as a control.   We show that Internet sales decrease significantly, 
but catalog sales are unaffected.  Further investigation indicates that the difference in 
these outcomes is partly attributable to the ease with which customers can search for 
lower prices at competing retailers.  We extend the analysis to a panel of multi-channel 
firms and show that retailers who earn a large proportion of their revenue from direct 
channels avoid opening a first store in high-tax states. We conclude that current U.S. 
sales taxes laws have significant effects on both customer and firm behavior. 
  
 
 “It is illogical and now patently unfair that Staples.com is required to collect and remit 
sales taxes because of our local commitment when many other dot.com competitors do 
not have a similar requirement.”  
Thomas Stemberg, founder of Staples 
 (letter to the US Congress, Stemberg 2005) 
 
1. Introduction 
State sales taxes can add up to nine percent to the price of an item.  However, if a retailer does 
not have a physical presence in a state, such as a warehouse, office or retail store, it is not 
required to collect these taxes.  This distinction is crucial for retailers that sell through direct 
channels. The obligation to collect taxes from Internet and catalog sales depends on whether the 
retailer has a physical presence in the customer’s state.  In this paper, we investigate how the 
obligation to collect sales taxes affects both customer and firm behavior.  We consider two 
related research questions.  First, does collecting sales taxes have a negative impact on sales 
through Internet and catalog channels?  If there is a negative impact on sales, then we might 
expect it to also affect firm behavior.  This motivates our second research question: are direct 
retailers less likely to establish a physical presence in high-tax states?   
 
We show that the answer to the first question depends on which direct channel we consider.  The 
obligation to collect and remit sales taxes produces a significant decrease in Internet sales but no 
change in catalog sales.  We conclude that the obligation to collect sales taxes has a significant 
effect on customer behavior, but that there are boundaries to these effects.  These boundaries 
reflect limits on a customer’s ability or incentive to search for lower prices at competing 
retailers.  If search is difficult, because it requires access to competitors’ catalogs, or if there is 
little incentive to search because prices are unlikely to be lower elsewhere, then the tax effects 
are mitigated.   
 
The evidence that taxes lower Internet sales but not catalog sales presents retailers with a trade-
off.  Should they forgo the benefits of opening a store in order to avoid damaging Internet 
demand?  We investigate how retailers resolve this trade-off by evaluating whether tax rates 
affect store-opening decisions.  We find that retailers who conduct most of their business through 
direct channels avoid opening a first store in high-tax states.  We conclude that these retailers 
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 appear to be forward-looking, anticipating the growth of the Internet channel and avoiding the 
potential risk to this future revenue stream.   
 
Source of the Findings 
Our investigation of customer behavior takes advantage of a natural experiment.  We examine 
changes in customer behavior after the opening of a new retail store by a multi-channel retailer.  
Importantly, this is the retailer’s first store in the state, which introduces a legal obligation to 
collect sales taxes on all Internet and catalog orders shipped to that state.  We use a differences-
in-differences approach to measure the effect on Internet and catalog sales.  In particular, we 
compare the difference in sales before and after the store opening between two samples of 
customers.  One sample of customers lives in the state in which the new store was opened.  
These customers were not charged sales taxes on their Internet and catalog orders before the 
store opened, but were charged sales taxes after the store opened.  The second sample of 
customers lives in a neighboring state. These customers were not charged sales taxes either 
before or after the store opening.  By comparing the difference in sales over time between two 
groups of customers (the “differences-in-differences”), we benefit from two inherent controls.  
Measuring the change in purchases by the same customers over time allows us to control for 
individual customer characteristics, while comparing customers on either side of the border 
controls for time trends and other events that are common to both customer samples.      
 
Our analysis recognizes several potential confounds in the natural experiment.  First, opening a 
convenient store location may cause customers to shop more often or to substitute between 
channels.  To isolate the tax effect from other effects, we focus on customers who live more than 
100 miles from the new retail store.  Since this sample of customers cannot easily access the new 
store, we expect that the only impact of opening the new store is the introduction of sales taxes. 
 
The second key assumption in our customer analysis is that store opening and location decisions 
are exogenous.  Clearly, store locations are not chosen randomly.  Discussions with the firm’s 
managers (and analysis of historical transactions) confirmed that stores are located in areas with 
a high density of existing customers who often buy through the firm’s catalog and Internet 
channels.  In this sense, the store-location decision is endogenous as it is based on characteristics 
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 of customers in the retail trade area.  However, the customers in our sample are not near the retail 
trade area. It seems reasonable to assume that the store-location decision is not correlated with 
either observed or unobserved customer characteristics in our sample. 
 
Finally, our interpretation of the natural experiment requires that any factors that could affect the 
change in sales in the focal state, also affect sales in the neighboring state.  We use several 
robustness checks to investigate this issue.  First, we present data on historical purchases that 
reveal no systematic differences in the characteristics of customers living on each side of the 
border.  Second, we compare the mailing of catalogs and marketing materials to customers on 
both sides of the border to ensure they are similar.  Third, we inspect historical sales trends in the 
12 months prior to the new store opening.  This inspection reveals no apparent difference in sales 
trends between the two states.  Finally, we repeat our differences-in-differences analysis across 
different time periods and confirm that the change in orders in the focal state after the store 
opening do not arise in other periods.  Together, these robustness checks provide further support 
for our conclusions. 
 
Our analysis of firm behavior also addresses a potential confound.  We find that, all else being 
equal, a retailer is more likely to open a new store in a high-tax state.  This does not mean that 
high sales taxes attract retail stores.  High-tax states presumably have customer characteristics 
that attract retailers.  For example, we might attribute the tendency to open stores in New York 
despite its high tax rates to the relative wealth of the average New York resident.  To overcome 
this confound and isolate the impact of sales taxes, we measure store opening decisions for a 
panel of retailers.  We compare how these decisions vary both by state tax rate and by the 
amount of business that a retailer conducts through remote channels.  This comparison provides 
a control for store-opening trends that are common to all retailers, including the general tendency 
to open stores in high-tax states.      
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 Court Rulings and Related Literature 
The Supreme Court ruling in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady1 required a taxpayer to have a 
physical presence, or “nexus”, within a state before a state had jurisdiction to require the 
collection of sales taxes.  A later ruling in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota2 clarified that 
Quill, a Delaware corporation, was not obligated to collect North Dakota sales taxes from 
customers because Quill did not have a measurable physical presence in North Dakota. Although 
sales taxes do apply, the burden of collection resides with consumers rather than with merchants.  
The individual amounts involved are small and enforcement costs are high, so state governments 
have not aggressively pursued these tax revenues.   
 
This is not the first paper to recognize that state sales taxes may influence customer sales.  
Goolsbee (2000) uses survey data to investigate whether customers with Internet access are more 
likely to purchase a computer online if they live in high-tax areas.  Our paper differs from 
Goolsbee’s because the two papers measure different things.  Goolsbee describes how the size of 
the Internet sector grows as state tax rates increase.  By contrast, we measure what happens to 
Internet and catalog sales when a retailer is required to collect and remit sales taxes.  This is also 
not the first paper to investigate how tax rates affect store location decisions.  Manuszak and 
Moul (2008) demonstrate that gasoline tax differences affect both the location of gasoline 
stations and customers’ decisions about where to purchase their gasoline.  Given the nature of 
this product category, they focus solely on physical stores, and do not consider how the physical 
presence test affects remote retailers.  
 
There are at least two unpublished manuscripts that investigate how variation in local tax rates 
affects the size of the Internet sector.  Ellison and Ellison (2003) use hourly data collected from 
pricewatch.com. They find that increases in state sales taxes lead to substitution, with more 
customers purchasing over the Internet.  Brynjolfsson, Smith, and Montgomery (2004) study 
consumer “shopbot” behavior and report that consumers are more sensitive to a dollar of tax than 
to a dollar change in the unit price of an item.  
 
                                                 
1 430 U.S. 274 (1977) 
2 504 U.S. 298 (1992) 
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 A key challenge in this literature is establishing causality between tax rates and the consumer 
response.  Studies that infer a causal relationship from variation in tax rates between states suffer 
from the limitation that state tax rates may not be independent of other state characteristics.  
Indeed, we show that variation in tax rates affects whether a retailer establishes a physical 
presence in a state.  Hence, the variation in whether customers purchase over the Internet may 
reflect variation in the availability of alternative retailers.  More generally, any unobserved 
demand characteristics that are correlated with state tax rates may contribute to variation in sales.  
As a result, we risk misattributing the impact of these unobserved characteristics to differences in 
tax rates.  We overcome this potential limitation by using a natural experiment comparing 
changes in behavior for the same households over time.  This approach explicitly controls for 
unobserved state and customer characteristics. 
 
Structure of the Paper 
Section 2 measures the change in Internet and catalog sales when a direct retailer starts collecting 
sales tax.  The focus shifts to firm behavior in Section 3.  We investigate whether retailers with 
more direct business are less likely to establish a physical presence in a high-tax state.  Section 4 
concludes the paper with a review of the findings. 
 
2. Measuring Sales Responses Across Different Channels 
In this section we measure how customers of a multi-channel apparel retailer respond when the 
retailer starts collecting sales taxes on Internet and catalog orders.  The company sells men's and 
women's clothing through company-owned distribution channels, which include catalogs, an 
Internet site and retail stores.  The products are moderately priced ($48 on average) and 
customers purchase relatively frequently (1.2 orders containing on average 2.4 items per year).  
 
Our analysis focuses on a sample of 13,021 customers who live on either side of a border of the 
“focal” state in which the firm opened its new store.  This new store was a regularly priced store, 
not a factory store. Customers in the focal state did not pay sales taxes on catalog or Internet 
orders prior to the store opening, but were charged sales taxes from the date the store opened.  
For confidentiality reasons, we cannot reveal where the store is located. However, the focal state 
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 is one of 32 states that charges between 4% and 6% sales taxes on retail transactions. The 
neighboring state does not charge sales tax, so customers in this state paid no sales taxes on 
purchases from this company either before or after the new store was opened in the focal state.  
 
The 13,021 customers had all bought from the company’s Internet or catalog channels in the 39 
months before the store opened in the focal state.  They were identified by matching household 
zip codes to counties along either side of the state border with a neighboring state. The counties  
were small, each with a population of less than 150,000. We also considered two other criteria 
for selecting customers: customers who live in three-digit zip codes along the state border; and 
customers in 5-digit zip codes.  The three-digit zip codes are larger than the area covered by the 
counties and yielded 32,996 customers. The five-digit zip codes along the state border yielded 
just 692 customers.  Reassuringly, the key findings remain unchanged for all three selection 
criteria. 
 
We focus on this state border because all of the customers living on the border were more than 
100 miles from the new store and were not expected to be otherwise affected by the opening of 
the new store.  As expected, only 13 of the 13,021 customers made purchases at the new store.  
We caution that since customers living in this border region may differ from customers living 
elsewhere, it is possible that the magnitude of the tax effects will be different for customers who 
live elsewhere in the state.   
 
We observe customers’ historical purchases over a 51-month period, starting 39 months before 
the store opened and continuing until 12 months after.  It is helpful to divide this 51-month 
period into three different time periods: 
Historical Period:    13-39 months before the store opened 
Pre-Opening Period:  0-12 months before the store opened 
Post-Opening Period  0-12 months after the store opened 
We compare sales in the pre- and post-opening periods for customers in the focal and 
neighboring states. As we discussed, this differences-in-differences approach explicitly controls 
for customer differences and common changes in demand over time.  We also checked the 
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 robustness of our results by varying the lengths of the pre- and post-opening measurement 
periods.  Our findings are essentially unchanged under these alternative measures. 
 
We use data from the historical period (13-39 months before the store opened) to ensure that 
customers in the focal and neighboring states share similar characteristics.  We characterize 
customers using the Recency, Frequency and Monetary Value (RFM) of their historical 
purchases.  These RFM measures were developed by the direct marketing industry to segment 
customers and so serve as a natural basis for evaluating customer differences. Recency measures 
the number of days between a customer’s last order and the date of the store opening. We code 
this as a negative variable so that higher values represent more recent customers. Frequency 
describes the number of orders placed and Monetary Value describes the average dollar value of 
those orders. In Table 1 we report the average of these variables for the focal state and 
neighboring state during the historical period (13-39 months prior to the new store opening).  
Reassuringly, despite large sample sizes, the averages of these measures do not vary significantly 
between customers in the two states. We conclude that customers in the two states appear to 
share similar observable characteristics. 
Table 1.  A Comparison of Transactions by State During the Historical Period 
 Focal         State 
Neighboring 
State Difference 
Days since last purchase (Recency) -612.14   (2.75 ) 
-609.92 
(2.56) 
2.22 
(3.75)       
Number of orders placed (Frequency) 3.06 (0.05) 
3.20 
 (0.05) 
0.14 
(0.08)    
Average dollar value of orders (Monetary Value) $85.65 (0.92) 
$88.03  
(0.87)     
$2.38 
(1.27) 
Sample Size 4,963 5,682  
The data represent the mean of each variable.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
Estimating How Sales Taxes Affected Sales in the Focal State 
Our analysis focuses on the change in the number of orders placed by customers in the 
neighboring and focal state before and after the store opening.3  We begin by reporting 
                                                 
3 In preliminary analysis (available from the authors) we also investigated whether the store opening affected the 
composition of customers’ orders.  We found no change in the average price of the items that customers purchased, 
or the average number of items in their orders.   
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 univariate results and then turn to a multivariate approach.  The univariate results are reported in
Table 2, where we summarize the average number of orders placed by customers in the pre a
post-opening periods.  The averages are calculated separately for the different channels, and
customers in the different states.  Sales for the Internet channel represents orders placed over the 
firm’s website, while sales for the catalog represents orders received via mail or telephone.   
 
nd 
 for 
Table 2.  Average Number of Orders in the Pre and Post-Opening Periods 
 
Pre-Opening 
Period 
Post-Opening 
Period Difference 
Differences-in- 
Differences 
Internet Orders     
Focal State 0.197 
(0.009) 
0.164 
(0.008) 
-0.033** 
(0.009) -0.023* 
(0.012) Neighboring State  0.159 
(0.008) 
0.149 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
Catalog Orders     
Focal State 0.977 
(0.022) 
0.782            
(0.022) 
-0.195** 
(0.018) -0.002      
(0.024) Neighboring State 0.915 
(0.018) 
0.722 
(0.018) 
-0.193** 
(0.016) 
The table presents the mean values of the number of orders placed during the pre and post-opening periods (12-
months before and after the new store opened) calculated using 6,057 customers in the focal state and 6,964 
customers in the neighboring state.  The “difference” measure uses a paired-sample t-test.   The “differences-in-
differences” measure is derived by calculating the difference between the pre and post-opening periods in the 
number of orders placed by each customer, and then comparing the mean of these differences between 
customers in the focal and neighboring states.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
*Difference significantly different from zero, p < 0.05. 
**Difference significantly different from zero, p < 0.01. 
 
There are several findings of interest in Table 2.  First, we see that approximately 17% of the 
purchases occurred over the Internet channel.  This percentage was increasing at the time, and 
has continued to increase since these measurement periods.  Second, in both states we see a drop 
in catalog sales; this in part reflects substitution to the Internet channel.  It also results from our 
focus on a fixed panel of customers.  It is well-established in this industry that as a customer 
panel ages, customers tend to place fewer orders.  This attrition is generally attributed to changes 
in customers’ preferences, but also reflects address changes.  Third, Internet purchases in the 
neighboring state decrease only slightly between the pre- and post-opening periods, which is 
consistent with substitution from the catalog to the Internet channel.  However, in the focal state 
there is a large and significant drop in Internet sales between the two measurement periods.  This 
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 drop occurs despite the trend of customers to switch from the catalog channel to the Internet 
channel.  Notice that the comparison of interest is not merely the pre versus post difference, but 
whether this difference varies for customers in the focal and neighboring states.  We directly 
estimate this interaction in the multivariate analysis that follows. 
 
Regression Analysis 
Because the number of orders placed is a “count” measure we use Poisson regression.  In 
particular, we assume that the number of orders from customer i in period t (Qit) is drawn from a 
Poisson distribution where the mean of the distribution is represented by the parameter λit:  
( ) ( )Prob ,       where =0, 1, 2, ...,  and ln .
!
it q
it
it it it
eQ q q
q
−λ λ= = λ = βX   (1) 
We model the purchase rate as ln it itλ = βX , where the i subscript refers to the 13,021 customers 
and the t subscript refers to the pre- and post-periods (t = 1 or 2). Our initial analysis uses the 
following specification for the independent variables: 
0 1 2 3 *it it it it itPost Opening Focal State Post Opening Focal State= β +β +β +ββX  (2) 
The Post-Opening and Focal State variables are binary indicators identifying the post-opening 
period and customers in the focal state (respectively). Under this specification, Focal State 
controls for underlying differences between customers in each state and Post-Opening controls 
for common sales changes over time. The coefficient of interest is the interaction coefficient (β3), 
which measures the percentage change in post-opening sales among customers in the focal state 
compared to customers in the neighboring state. We will interpret β3 as the percentage change in 
orders placed due to the introduction of sales taxes in the focal state. In all specifications, we also 
include a household level random effect. In Table 3, we report our initial findings, where we 
distinguish between purchases over the Internet and purchases through the catalog channel (mail 
or telephone orders). 
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 Table 3.  Poisson Regression  
 Internet      Purchases 
Catalog       
Purchases 
Internet + Catalog  
Purchases 
Post-Opening * Focal State -0.116
* 
(0.056) 
0.014 
(0.028) 
-0.006 
(0.023) 
Focal State 0.212
* 
(0.095) 
0.066 
(0.039) 
0.089* 
(0.041) 
Post-Opening -0.069 (0.044) 
-0.237** 
(0.018) 
-0.210** 
(0.016) 
Constant -1.836
** 
(0.083) 
-0.089** 
(0.025) 
0.072* 
(0.030) 
Log Likelihood -10,667 -30,773 -34,083 
The table reports the Poisson regression coefficients from estimating Equation 2 using pre and post-
opening observations for the 6,057 customers in the focal state and 6,964 customers in the neighboring 
state (the sample size in each model is 26,042).  The model includes random effects at the household level.  
The model is estimated separately using the number of orders placed through the Internet or catalog 
channels as the dependent variable.  Statistical significance is computed using a panel bootstrap clustered 
by ZIP code, with 1,000 replications. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05. 
**Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01. 
 
The results reveal the same pattern as the univariate results, and appear to confirm that the 
obligation to charge sales taxes has a different impact on sales in the two channels.  The store 
opening in the focal state is associated with an 11.6% decrease in Internet sales (after controlling 
for the change in sales in the neighboring state).  This effect is statistically significant (p<0.05).  
By contrast, sales in the catalog channel are apparently unaffected by the introduction of sales 
taxes.  When we aggregate sales across both channels, the overall impact is negative but not 
significantly different from zero.  
 
The Post-Opening and Focal State variables separately control for systematic differences over 
time and between states (respectively).  As expected, the negative coefficient for the Post-
Opening variable captures the expected natural attrition of customers.  The coefficient for Focal 
State is positive and significant in two of three models.  This is consistent with the results in 
Table 2, which indicate that customers in the focal state place more orders through the catalog 
and Internet in both the pre-period and post-period than customers in the neighboring state.  The 
presence of retail stores in the neighboring state may partially explain this difference.  Sales 
through the retail channel may cannibalize from Internet and catalog purchases in the 
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 neighboring state. These stores were opened over a decade earlier, so their availability is constant 
during the periods we consider.  A potential concern is that the rate of substitution to and from 
the store channel may have changed over time.  When we re-estimate our model with only store 
purchases, the pre versus post comparisons do not differ between the two states (the interaction 
between Focal State and Post Opening is small and insignificant).  We conclude that the new 
store opening in the focal state did not lead to differences between the two states in the rate of 
store purchases.   
 
As a robustness check, we also replicated the analysis in Table 3 using a linear model: 
0 1 2 3 *it it it it it itQ Post Opening Focal State Post Opening Focal State= β +β +β +β + ε    (3) 
This linear model allows us to check whether the findings are specific to the Poisson 
specification.  The findings for the linear model are reported in Table 4.  Although the 
magnitudes of the coefficients are not directly comparable between the two models, the pattern 
of results is consistent.  The introduction of sales taxes is associated with a significant reduction 
in Internet orders, but no change in catalog orders. 
Table 4.  Linear Regression:  
All Purchases, Internet Purchases and Catalog Purchases 
 Internet      Purchases 
Catalog       
Purchases 
Internet + Catalog  
Purchases 
Post-Opening * Focal State -0.023
* 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.025) 
-0.025 
(0.024) 
Focal State 0.038
* 
(0.016) 
0.062 
(0.036) 
0.100* 
(0.047) 
Post-Opening -0.011 (0.007) 
-0.193** 
(0.014) 
-0.204** 
(0.016) 
Constant 0.159
** 
(0.013) 
0.915** 
(0.023) 
1.074** 
(0.031) 
Log Likelihood -24,806 -45,840 -48,285 
The table reports the linear regression coefficients from estimating Equation 3 using pre and post-opening 
observations for the 6,057 customers in the focal state and 6,964 customers in the neighboring state (the 
sample size in each model is 26,042).  The model includes random effects at the household level.  The 
model is estimated separately using the number of orders placed through the Internet or catalog channels as 
the dependent variable.  Statistical significance is computed using a panel bootstrap clustered by ZIP code, 
with 1,000 replications. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05. 
**Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01. 
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 Reasons Sales May Have Changed  
Recall that the critical identifying assumption is that any extraneous factors (other than the 
introduction of sales taxes) that affected the change in demand in the focal state also affected
demand in the neighboring state. Therefore, when checking robustness we need to focus on 
factors that may have contributed to a change in the number of pre- and post-opening purch
One possibility is that direct-mail promotional activities may have varied in the focal state 
following the store opening.  If so, we might be misattributing our results to the collection of 
sales taxes rather than these activities. To check for this, we investigated whether there was a 
change in the number of catalogs or other promotional materials sent to customers in each sta
before and after the store opening. Reassuringly, we found no systematic differences.   As a 
further check, we re-estimated E
 
ases.  
te 
quation 2 with a control variable for retail promotions, and our 
ndings remained unchanged.  
 
ggests that there was no systematic difference in the historical sales trends for 
e two states.    
rence in these trends, we estimated the 
llowing household-level Poisson regression model:  
  
    (4) 
 
he two states.  Reassuringly, none of 
ese coefficients were significantly different from zero.  
 
fi
 
We also investigated whether in the months before the store opening there was a similar time 
trend in monthly sales.  In Figure 2 we report the average monthly purchases by households over 
the course of the calendar year before the new store opened for each of the two states.  Inspection
of these figures su
th
 
To evaluate more formally whether there was any diffe
fo
12 12
1 1
 +  *it t it t it it
t t
X Month t Month t Focal State
= =
β = β η∑ ∑
 
The dependent variable was the number of items purchased by each household in each of the 12
months preceding the store opening, and Month t denotes dummy variables identifying each of 
these months (these incorporate the intercept).  The coefficients of interest are η1, …, η12, which 
measure whether the monthly time trends varied between t
th
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 Figure 2: Time-Trend of Items Purchased by Households in Each State  
by Month in the Calendar Year Prior to Store Opening 
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The data in the figure summarizes the average number of orders by customers in the focal and 
neighboring states in the 12 months before the new store opened.  The averages are calculated separately 
for each of the 12 months in the pre-opening period. 
 
 
As a final check for robustness, we repeated our analysis for other historical time periods to 
assess whether the difference in sales trends between the two customer samples was unique to 
the store opening period.  If there are no differences in the historical trends for the two states, we 
should not find an interaction between the Post-Period and Focal State variables.  To investigate 
this issue, we re-estimated Equation 2 using the same pre and post-period calendar dates one year 
before and one year after the store opened.  The results are reported in Table 5.   
 
The Post-Period * Focal State coefficients confirm that there was no significant difference 
between the two states in the rate at which sales changed over time.  This suggests that the 
difference in the sales in these two states after the store opening was unusual, and gives us 
greater confidence that we can attribute this difference to the store-opening.   
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 Table 5.  Robustness Check  
Repeating the Analysis in Time Periods Without Store Openings 
 1-year Before 1-year After 
 Internet Catalog Internet Catalog 
Pseudo Post-Opening * Focal State 0.016         
(0.035)        
0.024   
(0.014)        
-0.071 
(0.074) 
-0.025 
(0.039) 
Focal State 0.269**       
(0.071)        
0.064         
(0.039)        
0.248** 
(0.078) 
0.064 
(0.045) 
Pseudo Post-Opening -0.333**      
(0.027)        
-0.720**       
(0.010) 
0.154** 
(0.034) 
0.011 
(0.029) 
Constant -2.207** 
(0.051) 
0.728 
(0.030) 
-1.826** 
(0.061) 
-0.426** 
(0.036) 
Log-Likelihood -6,578 -39,006 -11,702 -26,330 
The table reports the Poisson regression coefficients from estimating Equation 2 using pre and post periods 
centered 1 year before and 1 year after the new store opened. The models are estimated using the 6,057 
customers in the focal state and 6,964 customers in the neighboring state (the sample size in each model is 
26,042) and include random effects at the household level.  The dependent variable is the number of orders 
placed through the Internet or catalog channels.  Statistical significance is computed using a panel bootstrap 
clustered by ZIP code, with 1,000 replications. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05. 
**Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01. 
 
 
Differences Across Product Categories 
We also consider how the tax effect varies by the type of item purchased.  The firm sells 
women’s clothing, men’s clothing and “other” items (other items include home furnishings, 
luggage and clothing for children).  There are small differences in the sales for each category 
across the two channels.  For example, women’s clothing represents 29.0% of catalog sales and 
33.5% of Internet sales, while men’s clothing represents 28.2% of catalog sales and 25.8% of 
Internet sales.  It is possible that these preferences for purchasing different items in the two 
channels may have contributed to the contrasting findings.  To investigate this possibility we re-
estimated the models in Table 3 using separate measures of sales for each product category.  
These findings (which are available from the authors) again replicate the pattern of findings in 
Table 3.  There is a decrease in Internet sales across all three product categories, and this 
decrease is significant (p<0.05) in all but the men’s category.  In contrast, there is effectively no 
change in catalog sales in either channel (the Post-Opening * Focal State coefficients do not 
approach significance).  These findings further confirm the robustness of the results in Table 3.  
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 They also suggest that the contrast in the Internet and catalog findings cannot be explained by 
differences in which product categories are purchased in the two channels. 
 
We conclude that there is robust evidence that collecting sales taxes had a substantial negative 
effect on Internet sales.  Surprisingly, there was no measurable decrease in catalog sales.  We 
now examine why. 
 
Explanations for the Difference in Catalog and Internet Findings 
We consider three explanations for why we observe a decrease in Internet sales, yet no 
appreciable change in catalog sales: 
 
1. Awareness:  Chetty, Looney and Koft (2007) report findings from a series of field 
experiments showing that consumers may react differently if taxes are made salient at the 
point of purchase.  This effect could have contributed to our results as the salience of the tax 
calculation varies when ordering by telephone and the Internet.  When completing an order 
over the telephone, customers in our study are often told only the total amount of the order.  
Because most customers order multiple items (the average order size is 2.3 items) and the 
total amount may include other components such as shipping charges, it is possible that these 
customers do not realize that the total amount includes sales tax.  In contrast, Internet 
customers can see taxes explicitly calculated on the checkout page.  
 
2. Personal Interaction:  Telephone orders involve a personal interaction with a company 
representative, but ordering over the Internet is relatively impersonal.  As a result, when 
customers learn at the end of the transaction that they are being charged sales tax, they may 
feel more comfortable cancelling an Internet order than abandoning a telephone order. 
 
3. Customer Search:  When a firm collects sales tax, one possible customer response is to 
search for similar items at competing retailers that do not charge sales tax.  Customers who 
use the Internet channel may be more willing to search competing retailers than those who 
use the catalog channel.  This may reflect the ease of searching alternative retailers on the 
Internet.  Internet customers can simply visit the website of one of the firm’s many 
competitors.  In contrast, customers without computers or who are reluctant to purchase over 
the Internet must either visit a competitor’s store or wait until they receive competitors’ 
catalogs.  These options generally require more effort and more time than visiting a 
competing Internet site. 
 
It is likely that each of these explanations contributes to the findings, so we do not seek to isolate 
a single explanation.  Instead, our results elaborate on the earlier findings, and help to reveal the 
relative contribution of these three explanations. 
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 We proceed in two steps. First, we distinguish between two types of catalog orders: orders by 
telephone and orders by mail. Telephone orders are made by calling the firm’s toll-free telephone 
number and speaking to a customer service representative. Mail orders are made using the order 
form bound into the middle of each catalog. When ordering by mail, a customer lists the desired 
items and their prices, calculates a total, and then computes the sales taxes (if any). The customer 
can then pay via a personal check, money order or credit card.  Under the Awareness and 
Personal Interaction explanations, orders by mail share characteristics similar to Internet orders: 
they include an explicit calculation of sales taxes and do not involve a personal interaction with a 
customer service representative.  On the other hand, customers ordering by mail can turn to the 
same range of competing retailers as customers ordering by telephone.  Therefore, if the 
Awareness and Personal Interaction explanations play an important role in determining 
customers’ reactions, we would expect to see an outcome for mail orders similar to the one that 
we observe for Internet orders.   
 
Second, we investigate the role of customer search by identifying a class of items for which we 
do not expect customers to search competing retailers in either channel.  If the search explanation 
is important, we would expect to see the same (null) effect for these items in the Internet channel 
as we see in the catalog channel.  
 
Comparing Mail and Telephone Orders for the Catalog Channel 
In our data, 16.1% of the firm’s direct orders are placed via the Internet, 80.7% are placed via 
telephone, and only 3.2% are placed via mail.  In our earlier analyses we subsumed both mail 
and telephone orders into the catalog channel.  In Table 6, we distinguish between the mail and 
telephone channels and repeat our earlier analysis (we also include the Internet results from 
Table 3 as a benchmark).   
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 Table 6.  Poisson Regression:  
Mail Purchases, Telephone Purchases, and Internet Purchases 
 Mail             Telephone  Internet   
Post-Opening * Focal State  -0.025 
(0.116) 
0.017 
(0.029) 
-0.116* 
(0.056) 
Focal State  0.181 
(0.117) 
0.060 
(0.044) 
0.212* 
(0.095) 
Post-Opening -0.491** 
(0.097) 
-0.227** 
(0.018) 
-0.069 
(0.044) 
Constant -3.210** 
(0.086) 
-0.134** 
(0.027) 
-1.836** 
(0.083) 
Log Likelihood -3,468 -29,938 -10,667 
The table reports the Poisson regression coefficients from estimating Equation 2 using pre and post-
opening observations for the 6,057 customers in the focal state and 6,964 customers in the neighboring 
state (the sample size in each model is 26,042).  The model includes random effects at the household 
level.  The model is estimated separately using the number of items purchased from the Internet, mail or 
telephone channels as the dependent variable.  Statistical significance is computed using a panel 
bootstrap clustered by ZIP code, with 1,000 replications. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05. 
**Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01. 
 
Recall from our previous discussion that if the Awareness and Personal Interactions 
explanations were important, we would expect the result for mail orders to mimic the outcome 
for Internet orders.  This is not the case.  The results for the mail channel actually mimic the 
telephone channel: the obligation to collect sales taxes did not significantly affect either mail or 
telephone orders. These findings suggest that the contrasting findings in Table 3 cannot be fully 
explained by the Awareness and Personal Interaction interpretations.   
 
Customer Search Behavior 
When a firm begins to collect sales taxes, a natural reaction by customers is to look for similar 
products at competing retailers that do not charge sales taxes.  It is this anticipated customer 
reaction that prompted the founder of Staples to address his concerns to the US Congress (see the 
quote at the start of the paper).  If the relative ease of searching on the Internet means that 
competitive comparisons are more likely on the Internet channel than the catalog channel, then 
differences in customer search behavior may explain why sales taxes reduce Internet sales. 
 
To investigate this explanation, we identified a sample of items for which customers are unlikely 
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 to search competing retailers in either channel.  If the contrasting findings in Table 3 are due to 
differences in customer search behavior, we would not expect any difference in the findings 
across the two channels when restricting attention to these items.  Our first approach was to look 
for items that are only sold by this retailer.  Unfortunately this approach was not successful.  We 
identified a sample of items that we believed were most likely to be unique to this firm, but an 
Internet search quickly identified relatively close substitutes at competing stores for each of the 
products in this sample. 
 
As an alternative, we recognized that if the firm discounts the price of an item, customers are less 
likely to find lower prices at competing stores.  Indeed, there is evidence elsewhere that one of 
the roles of retail “sales” is to signal to customers that they need not continue searching for lower 
prices at competing stores (see for example Anderson and Simester 1998).  This suggests that if 
an item is discounted, customers may be less likely to compare prices at competing retailers – 
even when the firm begins to collect sales tax.  This offers an opportunity to test whether 
differences in customer search behavior across the channels explains the different findings.   If 
we restrict attention to items that are discounted, and this limits the extent of customer search,  
we should observe the same (null) results in both channels. 
 
The retailer typically charges the same price in its Internet channel as it charges in the catalog 
channel.  As a result, there is almost no difference in the distribution of items purchased at a 
discount through the two channels.  In the 39 months before the store opened, 11.5% of the items 
purchased on the Internet channel and 11.7% of the items purchased in the catalog channel were 
sold at a discounted price. The average price reduction was also almost identical across the two 
channels; the mean was $7.42 for the catalog channel and $7.22 for the Internet.  We also 
compared the selection of items purchased at discounted prices through the two channels. The 
largest difference was in women’s clothing, where 15.9% of the catalog purchases were made at 
a discount, compared to 17.5% over the Internet. 
 
In Table 7, we repeat our earlier analysis when distinguishing between purchases made at a 
discount and purchases made at full price (since a single order may combine regular price and 
sale items, the purchase amount is measured as number of items rather than number of orders).  
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 The findings follow precisely the predicted pattern.  For discounted purchases, there is no 
difference between the Internet and catalog channels: the change in sales tax policy does not 
affect sales in either condition.  This is consistent with customers recognizing that they are 
unlikely to find lower prices for these items at competing stores, even after the firm starts 
charging sales taxes.  For items purchased at full price, we see the now familiar pattern that 
Internet sales decrease in the focal state when the retailer collects sales tax, but there is no 
change in catalog sales. 
 
These findings support the interpretation that the contrasting impact of sales taxes on sales in the 
two channels is due to differences in customer search behavior.  This interpretation relies on our 
claim that when items are discounted, customers are unlikely to search for lower prices at 
competing retailers.  Notice that the strength of this claim depends in part on the depth of the 
discounts: in general, the larger the discounts, the less likely it is that customers will find lower 
prices elsewhere. The findings again follow the pattern that we would predict.  If we restrict 
attention to purchases at “deep” discounts of more than 25%, the Post-Opening * Focal State 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero (or from each other) in either channel.  
However, for “shallow” discounts of less than 25%, the results return to the earlier pattern:  the 
introduction of sales taxes is associated with a significant (8.8%) decrease in Internet sales, but 
no change in catalog sales. 
 
We also investigated whether the finding reported in Table 7 could be explained by differences 
in customer preferences for purchasing discounted rather than regularly priced items.  We used 
transaction data from the historical period to calculate the percentage of items that customers had 
historically purchased at discounted prices, and then interacted this measure with Post-Opening * 
Focal State. Our estimate for this additional interaction was both small and insignificant.  We 
conclude that the findings survive when we explicitly control for differences in customers’ 
propensity to purchase at a discount.  
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 Table 7.  Purchases at Full Price and Discount in Both Channels 
 Purchases at a Discount Purchases at Full Price 
 Internet  Catalog  Internet  Catalog  
Post-Opening * Focal State 0.044 
(0.214) 
0.059 
(0.114) 
-0.204* 
(0.084) 
-0.006 
(0.041) 
Focal State 0.134 
(0.200) 
0.048 
(0.084) 
0.197* 
(0.100) 
0.067 
(0.049) 
Post-Opening 0.016 
(0.114) 
0.052 
(0.094) 
0.045 
(0.057) 
-0.247** 
(0.030) 
Constant -2.533** 
(0.131) 
-1.131** 
(0.070) 
-1.250** 
(0.081) 
0.602** 
(0.032) 
Log Likelihood -4,180 -14,577 -13,223 -41,789 
The table reports the Poisson regression coefficients from estimating Equation 2 using pre and post-opening 
observations for the 6,057 customers in the focal state and 6,964 customers in the neighboring state (the 
sample size in each model is 26,042).  The model is estimated separately using purchases made at the full price 
or at a discounted price from the Internet or catalog channels.  Statistical significance is computed using a 
panel bootstrap clustered by ZIP code, with 1,000 replications. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05. 
**Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01. 
 
Summary  
We have measured how establishing a physical presence in a state affects purchases through 
Internet and catalog channels. The results suggest that the obligation to collect and remit sales 
taxes leads to a significant decrease in Internet sales, but no appreciable change in catalog sales.  
This is a robust result that extends to different customers and different products.   
 
We evaluate three explanations for why we do not observe a reaction to sales taxes in the catalog 
channel. Evidence that mail orders mimic telephone orders (rather than Internet orders) suggests 
that the contrasting results cannot be explained by either the role of personal interactions with 
customer service representatives, or by a lack of awareness among catalog customers that the 
firm is collecting sales taxes.  Neither of these explanations can be applied to orders placed via 
mail.  Customers ordering by mail explicitly calculate sales taxes themselves, and generally do 
not have a personal interaction with a customer service representative.  
 
The third explanation focuses on the role of customer search.  We show that the impact of sales 
taxes is moderated by whether an item is discounted.  The negative sales tax effect is isolated to 
 Page 20
 non-discounted items purchased over the Internet.  For these items, customers have the greatest 
incentive to search (high prices) and the greatest ease of search (the Internet).  When a price is 
already deeply discounted, customers may be unlikely to consider alternative retailers even if the 
firm charges sales tax.  Moreover, customers who order through the catalog channel face a much 
more difficult search task: they must wait to receive competitors’ catalogs in order to compare 
prices. We conclude that the contrasting impact of taxes on Internet and catalog sales appears to 
be at least partly attributable to differences in customer search behavior. 
 
In the next section, our focus shifts to firm behavior and we consider whether having to collect 
sales taxes affects retail store opening decisions. 
 
3. The Impact on Firms’ Store Location Decisions 
Our analysis of customer behavior in Section 2 shows that an obligation to collect sales taxes 
reduces purchases through the Internet channel.  This introduces an interesting empirical 
question.  The evidence that sales taxes lower demand suggests that retailers will take this into 
account when deciding where to open physical stores, by avoiding states with high tax rates.  On 
the other hand, the reduction in demand is limited to the Internet, which was small at the time of 
the study, though growing quickly.  This presents the retailers with a trade-off: should they forgo 
the benefits of opening a store in order to avoid damaging demand in a new channel that, while 
currently small, promises to be an important source of future revenue?  In this section we 
investigate how retailers responded to this trade-off by evaluating whether sales taxes affected 
their store-opening decisions.   
 
To investigate how state tax rates affect store opening decisions, we constructed a dataset from 
several sources.  First, we identified a sample of apparel, jewelry, sporting goods and home 
furnishing retailers that sell through both retail stores and direct (Internet and catalog) channels. 
The sample was identified from the 2005 Multichannel Merchant 150, which includes a 
description of each retailer’s business, together with the percentage of sales conducted through 
retail stores and direct channels.  We restricted the sample to retailers with fewer than 200 stores, 
and excluded any retailers that charged sales taxes on Internet and catalog purchases in states in 
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 which they did not have a physical presence.4  Second, we used the Retail Tenants Directory to 
identify states in which retailers had physical retail locations. This annual publication is used by 
landlords, retailers and realtors to support the retail leasing process. It contains detailed profiles 
of retailers across the United States - listing individual retail locations. The intersection of 
retailers listed in both the Multichannel Merchant 150 and the Retail Tenants Directory resulted 
in a panel of 14 retailers. 
 
It is important to note that the Multichannel Merchant 150 distinguishes only sales through direct 
channels and physical stores; it does not distinguish between the Internet and catalog channels. 
As a result, we cannot compare the store-opening decisions of retailers that conduct most of their 
business over the Internet with the decisions of retailers who use the catalog channel.  However, 
we can compare the decisions of retailers that use direct channels with those that sell primarily 
through physical stores.  The potential loss of Internet sales affects only the first group, so we 
look for evidence that these retailers avoid opening stores in high tax states.  For retailers with 
little direct business, the potential loss of Internet sales is less important. In order to compete in a 
state, these retailers generally have to open a physical store.   
 
The analysis that follows is limited to the 48 contiguous states.  Including observations for 
Hawaii, Alaska and Washington DC had little impact on the findings.  We also omit 19 
observations to remove states with either company headquarters or fulfillment centers.  These 
qualify as a physical presence, so there is no incremental tax effect from opening a store in these 
states.   
Analysis 
As a preliminary analysis, we grouped the 14 retailers according to the percentage of their sales 
that are direct, and report the average tax rate in states with and without a physical store.  The 
analysis reveals two findings of interest: 
1. Retailers with a high percentage of direct business have a strong tendency to open stores in 
states with lower tax rates.  For retailers that earn more than 70% of their revenue from direct 
                                                 
4 For example, we excluded Lands End as it was acquired by Sears in the middle of our analysis period.  Similarly, 
we excluded Orvis, because it charges sales taxes even in states in which it does not have a physical presence.  This 
(conservative) policy is apparently designed to avoid liability for tax penalties that may arise because of ambiguities 
in the definition of a “physical presence”. 
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 channels, the average tax rate in states with stores is 2.65%.  This is significantly (p < 0.01) 
lower than the 4.90% average rate in states without stores.   
2. Retailers that have less direct business actually prefer high-tax states, presumably because 
these states have other characteristics that make them attractive.  Among these retailers, the 
average tax rate in states with stores is 5.06%, which is significantly (p < 0.01) higher than 
the 4.51% average rate in states without stores.  The difference between 5.06% and 2.65% is 
also significant (comparing states with stores for the two groups of retailers). 
 
These univariate findings are consistent with our prediction that store location decisions are 
influenced by an interaction between state tax rates and the amount of business that the retailer 
conducts through direct channels.  We can directly estimate this interaction using a multivariate 
approach, which also allows us to explicitly control for state and retailer differences.  We will 
focus on a retailer’s decision to open a first store in a state.  After this first store, there is no 
incremental change in the tax policy if a retailer opens additional stores.  We will later also 
consider the decision to open subsequent stores in a state, to confirm that the deterrence of high 
tax rates (if any) is limited to the first store. 
 
We begin by identifying states in which the retailers did not have stores in 2001.  We then use 
data from 2004 to identify whether retailers had opened a first store in those states by 2004.  In 
particular, we used the Retail Tenants Directory to identify states in which the panel of retailers 
did not have a retail store, headquarters, or fulfillment center in 2001. On average the retailers 
had approximately 35 states without stores, so across all 14 retailers this resulted in a sample of 
450 state-retailer observations in which there was an opportunity to open a first store. For each of 
these 450 observations, we then used the Retail Tenants Directory to determine whether a store 
had been opened by that retailer in that state by 2004.  The dependent measure in the analysis is 
Store in 2004r,s, which is a binary variable indicating whether retailer r had a store in state s in 
2004.  The average of this dependent variable is 12% (there were 54 instances in which retailers 
had entered a state and opened a new store by 2004).   
 
The goal of the analysis is to explain the variation in this dependent measure, and in particular 
whether retailers with a high percentage of direct sales were less likely to open stores in high tax 
states.  The analysis used logistic regression, and included the following independent variables: 
 Page 23
 Interaction of Interest  
Tax Rates * Percent Directr The interaction between Tax Rates and Percent Directr. 
Controls for State Characteristics 
Tax Rates The 2001 tax rate in state s. 
Stores in States The total number (in hundreds) of retail stores in state s in 2001 for 
the sampled product categories (excluding retailers in the sample). 
State Store Growths The percentage change in Stores in States between 2001 and 2004. 
Controls for Retailer Characteristics 
Percent Directr The percentage of retailer r’s 2001 sales that comes from direct 
(Internet and catalog) channels. 
Apparelr A binary variable indicating whether retailer r sells apparel.  
Controls for State-Retailer Interactions 
Bordering Statesr,s A binary variable indicating whether in 2001 retailer r had stores in 
any state bordering state s. 
Other Close Statesr,s A binary variable indicating whether in 2001 retailer r had stores in 
any state two borders from state s. 
 
Summary statistics for all the variables are reported in the Appendix (Table A1).  Our focus is 
the interaction between Tax Rates and Percent Directr.  We predicted that retailers will avoid 
opening stores in high-tax states if they conduct a large proportion of their business through 
direct channels. Therefore we expect the interaction between Tax Rates and Percent Directr to 
yield a negative coefficient: retailers with a high percentage of direct sales are less likely to open 
stores in high tax states.  The findings are summarized in Table 8 where we report two models.  
Model 1 is a logistic regression model, while Model 2 re-estimates the model using retailer 
random effects.  Standard errors in the first model are clustered by firm.  
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 Table 8.  Logistic Regression:  
The Probability of Opening a First Store in a State 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Tax Rates * Percent Directr -116.403
** 
(34.737) 
-199.390* 
(82.862) 
Tax Rates 74.552
** 
(25.692) 
133.233* 
(53.567) 
Percent Directr 5.861
* * 
(1.882) 
8.106 
(6.257) 
Stores in States 0.181  (0.163) 
0.598* 
(0.278) 
State Store Growths 5.808
** 
(1.549) 
7.132** 
(2.712) 
Bordering Statesr,s 1.820
** 
(0.414) 
0.560 
(0.713) 
Other Close Statesr,s 1.692 
** 
(0.331) 
0.983 
(0.629) 
Apparelr 2.236
** 
(0.784) 
1.983 
(3.358) 
Constant -10.349
** 
(1.603) 
-12.081** 
(3.620) 
Log Likelihood -126 -102 
Sample size 450 450 
The table reports logistic regression coefficients using the sample of states in which a retailer did not 
have a store in 2001.  The dependent variable measures whether the retailer had opened a store in 
that state by 2004.  The standard errors in Model 1 are clustered by firm, with asymptotic standard 
errors in parentheses.  Model 2 includes firm random effects, with standard errors computed using a 
panel bootstrap clustered by firm.   
*Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05. 
**Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01. 
 
The coefficient for the interaction between Tax Rates and Percent Directr is negative in both 
models.  We conclude that direct retailers appear to avoid opening stores in high tax states.  For 
robustness we also used OLS to re-estimate the same model with firm fixed effects.  These 
coefficients reveal that for a retailer with 100% direct business, a 1% increase in the sales taxes 
rate decreases the probability of opening a store in that state by approximately 4%.  This is 
similar to the marginal effect from the logistic regression model, which was approximately 3% 
(evaluated at the average observation).  Recall that the benchmark rate at which stores opened is 
just 12%, indicating that these estimated effects are relatively large. 
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This finding occurs despite the evidence that other retailers are attracted to high tax states.  It 
also occurs despite our finding in Section 2 that collecting sales taxes has little impact on catalog 
purchases.  It is possible that retailers were simply unaware that collecting sales taxes does not 
appear to affect catalog sales.  Alternatively, while most catalog retailers derived only a small 
proportion of their revenue from the Internet during this time period, this percentage was 
growing.  Retailers were obviously aware of this growth, and this trend may have contributed to 
their decisions to avoid opening stores in high-tax states.   
 
Notice that the interaction reported in Table 8 is not subject to the limitation that arises in 
previous studies measuring the impact of state tax rates.  As we discussed in the literature 
review, previous studies have grappled with the endogeneity of tax rates.  We are interested in 
the interaction between state tax rates and the percentage of business that the firm conducts 
through direct channels.  It is more difficult to identify alternative explanations for why only 
firms with a high percentage of direct business avoid entering states with high tax rates. 
 
Although the sample of 450 observations may appear robust, it is drawn from just 14 firms.  
Augmenting the sample is difficult because it requires knowing the percentage of direct sales.  
One approach (suggested by a reviewer) is to simply add firms that did not have either an 
Internet channel or catalog channel during this period.  When we add 421 observations from 
eleven apparel retailers without an Internet or catalog channel, the pattern and significance of the 
findings remains unchanged.     
 
Retailers that Already Have a Physical Presence  
The physical presence rule is invoked when the first store is opened in a state, so there is no 
incremental change in the tax policy if a retailer opens additional stores.  We would not expect 
state tax rates to dissuade a retailer from opening additional stores, even if the retailer has a large 
percentage of direct sales.  We can use the same sample of 14 retailers to test this prediction.  In 
particular, we repeat our analysis focusing on states in which the 14 retailers already had a 
physical presence in 2001.  Our dependent variable measures whether the firms had opened an 
additional store in these states by 2004.  As expected, the interaction between the state tax rate 
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 and the percentage of business conducted through direct channels (Tax Rate * Percent Remote) 
no longer approaches significance.  We caution, however, that because the Retail Tenants’ 
Directory does not always report the number of stores that a retailer has in a state, we were not 
always able to detect whether the number of stores had changed between 2001 and 2004.  This 
limits the sample size for this additional analysis to 98 observations. 
 
Anecdotal Evidence 
Anecdotal evidence offers further support for the conclusion that state tax rates influence firm 
decisions.  In 2004 Gateway Computers closed all its retail stores. Among the stated reasons for 
the move, sales taxes for online sales had apparently put Gateway at a disadvantage to other 
computer sellers. Cabela's and Bass Pro Shops, both large retailers of outdoor goods, have 
diverted corporate funds to lobbying to ensure they obtain concessions from many states on the 
collection of sales taxes.5 Some firms have used “entity isolation,” or the tactic of incorporating 
a subsidiary that owns all direct sales operations, to avoid having to collect taxes due to retai
locations. This practice, however, is becoming more difficult as states become more aggressive 
in pursuing sales tax revenues. For example, in a recent case in California, the State Equalization 
Board found that Borders.com owed $167,000 in sales tax on Internet sales from 1998-2001. The 
Board based its reasoning on the fact that Internet customers had been allowed to return books to 
Borders’ physical stores, despite the legally separate status of Borders and Borders.com.   
l 
                                                
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have shown how current sales tax rules influence both customer and firm 
behavior.  On the customer side, we study how an obligation to collect sales taxes affects 
purchases from a retailer’s Internet and catalog channels. We find that while Internet orders 
decrease by 11.6%, there is no apparent effect on catalog orders.  Further investigation reveals 
that the absence of any change in catalog orders can be partly attributed to the difficulty of 
searching for lower prices at competing retailers.  We show that even for the Internet channel, 
the introduction of sales taxes has little impact on sales when competitive search is unlikely to 
 
5 New York Times, November 30, 2005. 
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reveal lower prices.  In particular, the introduction of sales taxes had no impact on sales for 
deeply discounted items in either channel. 
 
Our firm-level analysis investigates whether a sample of multi-channel retailers’ store expansion 
decisions are affected by state tax rates.  We find that retailers that have a larger proportion of 
direct sales are less likely to enter a state with high sales taxes. We interpret these results as 
evidence that store expansion decisions are affected by the current discrepancy in tax rules.   
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 Table A1.  Descriptive Statistics for the Retail Data 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Open Store in 2004r,s 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.33 
Tax Rates 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.02 
Percent Directr 0.67 0.11 1.00 0.30 
Stores in States (hundreds) 1.05 0.15 8.37 1.14 
State Store Growths 0.08 -0.12 0.36 0.10 
Bordering Statesr,s 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50 
Other Close Statesr,s 0.61 0.00 1.00 0.49 
Apparelr 0.54 0.00 1.00 0.50 
The table reports summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the firm analysis 
(Section 3).  The sample size for all statistics is 450. 
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